11 Article XXV authorizes the contracting parties of the GATT to act in concert and to implement the provisions of the GATT ”which involve joint action and, in general, to facilitate the operation and promote the objectives of the GATT.” Frieder Roessler, former director of legal services at GATT, used this power ”to establish relationships with states, international organizations and individuals and, to that end, to take legal personality under international and communal law.” Frieder Roessler: The Competence of GATT, J. World Trade L., No. 3, 1987, at 73, 75 Google Scholar. 32 Agreement between the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, 9 December 1996, reprinted as SELECTED DECISIONS, note 22, at 705 [hereafter referred to as the cooperation agreement]. 33 See note 1 above. Although the 1947 GATT is ”legally different from the 1994 GATT,” the text of the provisions discussed here is identical. WTO Charter Article 11:4. Collective intentionality also defined the limits of trade negotiations. In the early post-war years, the GATT negotiations focused on production, which was of great interest to developed countries. The negotiations largely excluded politically sensitive trade in services and especially agriculture, which was particularly attractive to developing countries. To take account of their participation, the GATT rules freed developing countries from reciprocal market opening and then extended these provisions to a broader special and differentiated treatment (see Michalopoulos 2001).
However, this feature, which worked as long as developing countries had little to negotiate in the negotiations, gave rise to a serious conflict with the principle of reciprocity of the GATT. The Searle model (2005) identifies constituent rules as another pillar of economic institutions, including members` rights and obligations, such as reciprocity, customs obligation and access to rules and compliance. The GATT framework had skilfully used the mercantilist instincts of governments to view access to the foreign market as access to profits and imports as a concession in trade negotiations. Their success depended on the willingness of all parties concerned to put market access trading chips on the table and, in practice, it became clear that significant access to the foreign market was rarely possible without providing meaningful access to the import market. However, when the negotiations then expanded to include agriculture and other sectors in which developing countries have become major global players, they have taken the legacy of S-D treatment to heart and sought to minimize the opening of their domestic markets. During the Doha Round, they also called for exceptions to the political space of liberalisation measures, which they said were at odds with their development programmes. This provision was part of the original GATT, but did not play a significant role until much later, when the active participation of developing countries became essential to the negotiation of an agreement. 58 As Sir Joseph Gold, the Fund`s former General Counsel, explained, there were political and diplomatic reasons to avoid the legal status of breach of its obligations: in all multilateral trade negotiations – particularly those as complex as the Uruguay Round negotiations – not all countries can expect to achieve positive results in every area of the procedure. However, in the context of a significant and significant reduction in border restrictions, all countries enjoy positive benefits, although there are sometimes temporary negative side effects. While the results of the Uruguay Round bring benefits to all developing countries, several aspects have been identified as potentially negative effects. The main part of this document takes these concerns into account in order to provide a balanced overview of the outcome of the negotiations for developing countries.